It has been found that contrarian oscillators usually take a negative role in the collective behaviors formed by conformist oscillators. However, experiments revealed that it is also possible to achieve a strong coherence even when there are contrarians in the system such as neuron networks with both excitable and inhibitory neurons. To understand the underlying mechanism of this abnormal phenomenon, we here consider a complex network of coupled Kuramoto oscillators with mixed positive and negative couplings and present an efficient approach, i.e. tit-for-tat strategy, to suppress the negative role of contrarian oscillators in synchronization and thus increase the order parameter of synchronization. Two classes of contrarian oscillators are numerically studied and a brief theoretical analysis is provided to explain the numerical results.
The conformists are represented by a positive coupling strength while contrarians by a negative coupling strength. It is believed that the positive coupling will force the oscillators to become synchronized while the negative coupling will drive the oscillators to be out of phase.
A simple model to study the collective be- 5, 6 . It is also revealed that local contrarians can be used to suppress undesired synchronization 4 . In sum, the contrarians usually take a negative role in the formation of collective behaviors.
On the other hand, we see the evidences that a highly coherence can be finally formed although there exist some contrarians in the system. For example, a final winner will be generated in political election with contrari- In this paper, we consider a complex network of coupled Kuramoto oscillators with mixed positive and negative couplings and present an efficient approach, i.e. tit-for-tat strategy, to suppress the negative role of contrarian oscillators in synchronization. We focus on two classes of contrarian oscillators and numerically find that the tit-for-tat strategy can increase the order parameter of synchronization for both classes. A brief theoretical analysis is provided to explain the numerical results. In fact, this approach of tit-for-tat has been widely used in the aspect of aggression in animals 20 , humans 21 , as well as in the social interaction among different bacterial species 22 , to enforce collaboration among selfish users. But a theoretical model to explain its microscopic mechanism is still lacking so far. The tit-for-tat strategy has two rules:
(1) cooperate if your partner cooperates and (2) defect if your partner defects [23] [24] [25] . We here use these two rules to the Kuramoto model with mixed positive and negative couplings.
In the previous studies, a contrarian oscillator can be distinguished from a conformist oscillator by the coupling term in two ways. In the first way, a contrarian oscillator will receive interactions from its neighbors by a negative coupling strength while a conformist oscillator will receive interactions from its neighbors by a positive coupling strength [4] [5] [6] . In the second way, a contrarian oscillator will give negative coupling to each of its neighbors while a conformist oscillator will give a positive coupling to each of its neighbors [7] [8] [9] . We here first discuss these two cases, respectively, and then theoretically show the mechanism of tit-for-tat strategy in coupled Kuramoto oscillators.
The paper is organized as follows. In Sec.
II, we present the model and discuss the Case I of contrarian oscillators receiving couplings with negative coupling strength. Then in Sec.
III, we discuss the Case II of contrarian oscillators sending negative coupling to their neighbors. After that, we present a brief theoretical analysis to explain the numerical results in Sec.
IV. Finally we summarize our results in Sec. V.
II. CASE I: CONTRARIAN OSCILLATORS RECEIVING COUPLINGS WITH NEGATIVE COUPLING STRENGTH
We consider a network of N coupled Kuramoto oscillators. Each oscillator is characterized by its phase θ i (t), i = 1, · · · , N and obeys an equation of motion defined aṡ
where λ i is the coupling strength of the oscillator i, ω i is its natural frequency, and A ij are the elements of the adjacency matrix A, so that To measure the coherence of the collective motion, we use the order parameter R 8, 26 :
where Ψ denotes the average phase, and R (0 ≤ R ≤ 1) is a measure of phase coherence. R will reach unity when the system is fully synchronized and be 0 for an incoherent solution.
As the conformists will attract each other to form a synchronized cluster and the contrarians will make each other be out of phase, the final formed collective behavior will depend on the competition between the conformists and the contrarians. In this sense, the contrarians will take a negative role to the final formed collective behavior. There are three kinds of links in the network: (1) conformist-conformist;
(2) contrarian-contrarian; and (3) conformistcontrarian. The first two kinds of links are symmetric while the third one is asymmetric.
To increase the order parameter R of synchronization, our idea is to let the asymmetric links of conformist-contrarian (the third one) become a symmetric link of contrarian-contrarian (the second one) by a probability P , i.e. the titfor-tat strategy. This strategy originates from the game theory such as the Prisoner's Dilemma where two individuals can each either cooperate or defect [23] [24] [25] . In this theory, the payoff to a player is in terms of the effect on its fitness. No matter what the other does, the selfish choice of defection yields a higher payoff than cooperation. But if both defect, both do worse than if both had cooperated. Thus, a safe strategy is to follow the simple rule of copying the last behavior of its partner. In this sense, the tit-for-tat strategy is proposed to enforce collaboration. In detail, we first find all the asymmetric links with
Then we let the positive one in the pair of λ i A ij and λ j A ij become negative by the probability P .
In numerical simulations, we first take the random Erdos-Renyi (ER) network with the average degree k = 6 as an example. We let the
with the central frequency ω 0 and γ is the half width at half maximum 27 . We let the parameters be shows how R depends on P . We see that R gradually increases with P , indicating that the tit-for-tat strategy can successfully suppress the negative role of contrarians in synchronization.
To reveal the underlying mechanism of titfor-tat strategy, we introduce two new order parameters R 1 and R 2 defined by
for the group of conformists and
for the group of contrarians. The lines with "circles" and "triangles" in Fig. 1(b) represent the R, R 1 and R 2 versus P for λ = 3.0, where the lines with "squares", "circles", and "triangles" represent the cases of the total oscillators, the group of conformists, and the group of contrarians, respectively.
dependence of R 1 and R 2 on P , respectively. It is easy to see that both R 1 and R 2 increase with R and are much larger than the corresponding total R. Especially, R 1 will be close to unity when P > 0.6, indicating that most of the conformists has become synchronized. To understand the relationship between the conformists and contrarians, Fig. 2 shows how the parameter P influences the evolution of the average phases Ψ 1 and Ψ 2 in Eqs. (3) and (4) To understand the phase difference ∆Ψ better, we introduce the link frustration f ij for a connected link i − j as follows 9, 28 Fig. 1(b) , respectively, we find that they are similar, indicating that the tit-for-tat strategy also works for the BA network. Then we notice that all the curves with "triangles" in Fig. 4(a) -(c) are approximate constant, implying that the nodes with lower degrees are not very important. However, we also notice that all the curves with "circles" in Fig.   4 (a)-(c) are sensitive on P only when P > 0.5.
The mechanism can be explained as follows. A characteristic feature of the BA network is that the hubs have a large number of links while the leaves have a few links. When the contrarians are chosen from the leaves, the links of conformist-contrarian will be small and thus their influence through the tit-for-tat strategy is also small, resulting the approximate constant curves with "triangles" in Fig. 4 . When the contrarians are chosen from the hubs, the links of conformist-contrarian will be large. However, as most of the neighbors of a hub are leaves, it is very possible for those links of hub-leaves to be chosen for the tit-for-tat strategy when P < 0.5.
We know that the leaves will not take an important role in the collective behaviors, thus resulting in the insensitive on P in the curves with "circles" in Fig. 4 for P < 0.5. When P > 0.5, the possibility to choose those links of hub-hub or hub-middle nodes for the tit-for-tat strategy will gradually increase, resulting in the sensitive on P in the curves with "circles" in Fig. 4 for P > 0.5. Similarly, we can understand the case of choosing the contrarians randomly, i.e. the curves with "squares" in Fig. 4 . In sum, the case of random uniformly distributed contrarians is much more sensitive to P , in contrast to the two cases of choosing the nodes of higher and lower degrees as contrarians, indicating that the tit-for-tat strategy may be more efficient when the contrarians are random uniformly mixed. This result is a little counterintuitive as we usually think that it would be more efficient to choose the nodes of higher degrees as contrarians. Thus, this finding is of interesting as it may have some applications. For example, in the case of epidemic spreading, people are more easy to be vaccinated when the contrarians are random distributed. For the same reason, in the political election, a final winner can be easier to be generated when the contrarians are random distributed.
III. CASE II: CONTRARIAN OSCILLATORS SENDING NEGATIVE COUPLING TO THEIR NEIGHBORS
In this case, Eq. (1) will be replaced by the following equatioṅ
where λ is the coupling strength of all the oscillators, and B ij = 1 when the connected neighboring node j is conformist and B ij = −1 when the connected neighboring node j is contrarian.
A distinguished difference between Eq. (1) and Eq. (7) is that in Eq. (1), all the neighbors of node i are in the same position. While in Eq. the tit-for-tat strategy.
In numerical simulations, we first take the random ER network with the same parameters as in Case I as an example. Fig. 5 shows the results corresponding to Fig. 1 . From Fig. 5(b) we 8 see that all the three curves gradually increase with P , indicating the efficiency of the tit-fortat strategy. Comparing Fig. 1 with Fig. 5 , we see that they have two differences: (1) All the curves in Fig. 5 are higher than the corresponding ones in Fig. 1 , indicating that the tit-for-tat strategy is more effective in Case II than in Case I. (2) When P < 0.2, all the three curves in Fig.   5 are overlapped but separated in Fig. 1 . This is because the coupling term in Eq. (7) is only determined by the neighbors of node i no matter node i is a conformist or a contrarian. When P = 0, Eq. (7) will be statistically the same for both a conformist and a contrarian and thus results in the overlap in Fig. 5(b) . While the coupling term in Eq. (1) is determined not only by the neighbors of node i but also by node i itself, which results in a difference between the conformists and the contrarians and thus the separation in Fig. 1(b) . Fig. 6 shows the influence of P on the evolution of the average phases Ψ 1 and Ψ 2 , corresponding to Fig. 2 . Comparing the corresponding curves in Fig. 6 with that in Fig. 2 , we observe that ∆Ψ is close to zero in Fig. 6 but close to π in Fig. 2 , indicating that the conformists and contrarians will become two independent synchronized groups in Case I but stay in the same synchronized group in Case II. Fig.7 shows the dependence of F on P , corresponding to Fig.3 . From Fig.7 we see that with the increase of P , F (1) there is one synchronized group in Case II and two synchronized groups in Case I; and (2) the tit-for-tat strategy is more efficient for the case of random uniformly distributed contrarians.
IV. A BRIEF THEORETICAL ANALYSIS
To understand the role of tit-for-tat strategy better, we here present a brief theoretical analysis. For the convenience of analysis, we rewrite Eq. (1) and Eq. (7) in a unified framework
with λ > 0. For Case I, we have C ij = A ij = 1 when node i is a conformist and C ij = −A ij = −1 when node i is a contrarian. For Case II, we always have C ij = B ij . We follow the Ref. 8 to introduce a local order parameter r i to quantify the coherence of the inputs to a given node i, which is defined by
where · · · t denotes a time average. The right side of Eq. (9) can be divided into two parts:
one from the conformist neighbors and the other from the contrarian neighbors. Thus, we rewrite Eq. (9) as
The links of conformist-contrarian are the key elements in Eq. (10) as the tit-for-tat strategy is applied only on them. We here take the case of P = 1 as an example. For Case I, we first discuss the case of a conformist node i. Before using the tit-for-tat strategy, all the C ij in Eq. (10) The enhanced r i will then make the r i of a contrarian node i increase. That is, all the r i will increase with P . In the global level, the order parameter R can be expressed as
Thus, the enhanced r i will make R increase with P , which explains the numerical results of 
1.
For Case II, we first discuss the case of a contrarian node i. Before using the tit-for-tat strategy, the C ij in the first term of the right side of 10 we see that all the three quantities R, R 1 and R 2 increase with P , no matter it is the Case I or Case II. Thus, the tit-for-tat strategy also works for other g or ρ. On the other hand, from Fig.   10 we notice that all the curves with g = 1/3 are above than that of g = 1/2 and then both of them are above that of g = 1/1, indicating that R, R 1 and R 2 decrease with the increase of g.
The strategy of tit-for-tat is widely used in animal and social competition and is proved to be an efficient way to reach a result of cooperation. The explanation of its microscopic mechanism results in a famous minority game theory based on payoff. In this paper, we first time apply this strategy to the networked systems of coupled oscillators. We reveal that the tit-for-tat strategy takes effect through two elements of the links of conformist-contrarian, i.e.
the phase difference and symmetry of the two couplings. The degree of the variation of these two elements will result in different order parameter R for synchronization. This finding is of meaningful in explaining how the neurons network with excitable and inhibitory neurons implements a diversity of cognitive processes, which is closely related to the degree of synchronization.
We notice from both Fig.3 and Fig.7 that the value of F for the links of contrarian-contrarian is approximately zero when P > 0.5, indicating that the phase difference between two contrarians is about π/2. This result tells us that a contrarian is always repulsive and thus it is difficult to reach a complete synchronized group of contrarians with R 2 = 1. Therefore, an effective way to increase R is to reduce the fraction of contrarian-contrarian interaction, i.e. avoiding two contrarians to be the nearest neighbors.
In conclusions, we have studied the synchronization of a networked system with both positive and negative couplings. We reveal that the negative role of repulsive oscillators to synchronization can be effectively reduced by applying a tit-for-tat strategy. Two kinds of negative couplings are considered and it is found that the titfor-tat strategy works for both of them. The underlying mechanism is to use the tit-for-tat strat- 
